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Note
CROSSPOLLINATION OF SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS
POST-DOMA: THE SUBTLE SOLUTION
DAVE WOODS
In the summer of 2013, the United States Supreme Court, to great
fanfare, struck down the central provision of the seventeen-year-old
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). Yet a second DOMA provision,
denying full faith and credit for same-sex marriages, was not overturned,
meaning individual states remain free to ban and refuse recognition for
same-sex unions. As a result, the parental rights of same-sex spouses who
move into anti-marriage-equality states may be imperiled. This Note
argues, however, that even when same-sex marriages are not supported
within a jurisdiction, parental rights emanating from those marriages will
be supported.
Surveying case law from states across the country to show that
statutory and common-law mechanisms work to preserve the parental
rights and responsibilities of members of same-sex unions, this Note goes
on to suggest that broad societal recognition of children’s need for parents
outweighs state-by-state positions on gay marriage. Hence, same-sex civil
rights are subtly being advanced nationwide by the day-to-day decisions of
state family courts. A migration of same-sex family law rights from
marriage-equality states into mini-DOMA states appears to be under way,
a process that gay-rights advocates can encourage as a subtle solution to
the anti-LGBT policy still prevailing in a majority of U.S. jurisdictions.
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CROSSPOLLINATION OF SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS
POST-DOMA: THE SUBTLE SOLUTION
DAVE WOODS*
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor2 was
celebrated by progressive legal activists for its invalidation of the Defense
of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).3 Crucially, the Windsor Court declared
section 3 of that Act, which for nearly seventeen years had precluded
federal recognition of gay marriage,4 to be unconstitutional.5 Yet section 2
of the Act, which enshrined state choice-of-law treatment for same-sex
relationships,6 remains in effect.7 In line with that section, a plethora of
states have enacted so-called “mini-DOMAs,” state statutes and/or
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriages and refusing to
honor such marriages conducted in other states.8 Prior to Windsor, thirtyfive states banned same-sex marriage—three by constitutional amendment,
five by state law, and twenty-seven by both.9 Post-Windsor, two states,
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015; University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, M.S. 2010; Defense Language Institute, A.A. 2005; Quinnipiac University, M.A.T. 1998,
B.A. 1996. My sincere thanks to Professor Marcia Canavan for inspiring and guiding this Note and to
Jean M. Doss for teaching me how real social progress occurs.
1
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96; see also Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
4
See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (restricting federal recognition of marriage to unions of one woman and one
man), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
5
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
6
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (denying full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for “a relationship
between persons of the same sex”).
7
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682–83.
8
See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265,
265–68 (2007) (reviewing the history of mini-DOMAs and delineating their varieties).
9
See Fernanda Santos, New Mexico Justices to Rule on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2013, at A14 (confirming that thirty-five states banned same-sex marriage as of October 2013, before
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Illinois and Hawai‘i, have adopted gay marriage legislatively, and one
state, New Mexico, has adopted it by judicial fiat,11 leaving thirty-three
states that continue to mount mini-DOMA regimes.12
The ongoing result of these mini-DOMAs is that same-sex couples,
including those legally married in any of the seventeen states that permit
gay marriages, may not be able to receive the legal benefits of marriage if
they enter mini-DOMA jurisdictions.13 To defenders of traditional
marriage, this disparity reflects the very state individuality evoked in the
Brandeis epigraph, with local populations properly defining their own civil
rights and procedures.14 For marriage-equality activists, the bifurcated
situation hearkens back to a Dred Scott-like environment of progressive
and recalcitrant regions in mutual strife.15
For lesbian/gay/
legalization by New Mexico, Hawai‘i, and Illinois); see also Gay Marriage, PROCON.ORG,
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014)
(showing same-sex-marriage policy statuses of all fifty states and effective dates of relevant laws).
10
See Derrick DePledge, Judge’s Decision Clears Way for Gay Marriages, HONOLULU STARADVERTISER, Nov. 15, 2013, at A1 (chronicling the passage of a marriage-equality law in Hawai‘i and
a critical subsequent state court’s ruling that the new law did not violate a 1998 marriage-defining
amendment to the Hawai‘i constitution); Monique Garcia & Ray Long, Lawmakers Affirm Gays’ Right
to Wed: Illinois Is Set to Join 14 Other States, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2013, at 1 (announcing the repeal of
Illinois’ mini-DOMA law despite a “year in which prospects for gay marriage often were dim”).
Hawai‘i had briefly allowed same-sex marriage in the window between December 1996 and December
1999, before the passage of a constitutional amendment re-validated a previously struck-down
marriage-limiting statute. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21–22 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (declaring denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples a violation of Hawai‘i
Constitution’s equal protection clause); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (D. Haw.
2012) (tracing the history of same-sex marriage in Hawai‘i, including an “unpublished summary
disposition” from the state supreme court holding that the 1998 amendment rendered challenges to state
same-sex marriage restrictions “moot”).
11
When the federal DOMA fell, New Mexico had neither approved nor banned same-sex
marriage, the only state not to have taken a position. See Santos, supra note 9 (describing same-sex
matrimony as an issue the New Mexico legislature “failed to resolve” and the governor “avoided”).
The New Mexico Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage on December 19, 2013, in a unanimous
ruling. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); see also Cindy Carcamo, New Mexico Joins 16
States, D.C. to Make Same-Sex Marriage Legal, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2013, at A3
(explaining the ruling and its effects).
12
See Masuma Ahuja & Emily Chow, Same-Sex Marriage Status in the U.S., WASH. POST POL.,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2014) (tracking ongoing changes in same-sex marriage and union policy in the United States). The
numbers and state statuses provided in this Note are accurate at the time of its publication; online
sources such as Ahuja & Chow’s provide routinely updated information as the legal landscape changes.
13
Koppelman, supra note 8, at 265–66.
14
See Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant Gays
the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 278 (2006) (discussing gay marriage
as a moral issue that DOMA supporters believe demands state-by-state regulation under the Tenth
Amendment).
15
See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 394 (1857) (ruling that one state’s elevating
a person’s status does not “entitle him to . . . any of the privileges and immunities of a citizen in
another state”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Robert A.
Burt, Overruling Dred Scott: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 WIDENER L.J. 73, 90 (2007)
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bisexual/transsexual (“LGBT”) activists, then, securing and enjoying the
privileges of marriage irrespective of state borders may be the next legal
hurdle. Yet even as that campaign accelerates, there is reason to believe
that in the battle over one of the most crucial legal effects of marriage—its
role in child-custody and child-support rights and obligations—same-sexmarriage proponents are already winning.
This Note argues that even in a mini-DOMA state, child-custody or
-support doctrines and statutory provisions that empower same-sex
partners may already be firmly in place. Part II of the Note will trace the
history of child rearing as a court-recognized right and benefit of marriage.
Part III will demonstrate that, historically, doctrines based on
psychological or implied parentage and/or parentage ascertained by
equitable or promissory estoppel may provide a means for LGBT
parents—particularly those emerging from divorces and break-ups—to
maintain their parental rights, even without access to the marriage
institution. Part IV will examine a federal statute, the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act16 (“PKPA”), which exists to force states to grant one
another full faith and credit for child-support and -visitation orders. Part V
will apply the implied-parentage and PKPA dynamics in analyzing three
geographically and culturally disparate mini-DOMA exemplar states—
Illinois, Montana, and Alabama—to examine their evolving positions on
the parental rights of members of same-sex couples. Finally, Part VI will
conclude that, ironically, there may be rights derived from same-sex
marriages that state statutory and common law protect even in states that
explicitly refuse to countenance same-sex unions. It will suggest that the
crosspollination of same-sex, family law rights from marriage-equality
states into mini-DOMA states is well under way and should be fostered by
gay-rights advocates as a subtle solution to the continuing presence of antiLGBT policy in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.
II. MARRIAGE AND THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND RAISE CHILDREN
Bringing forth children and holding them out to the community as
one’s own has long been a key benefit and oft-repeated underpinning of
state-sanctioned marriage. In fact, courts have often seemed eager to say
that procreation is the ab initio reason that marriage exists.17 As far back

(considering the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ effects on the Dred Scott era and
championing their similar application to same-sex issues today).
16
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012).
17
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (exalting procreation as the key
underpinning of marriage by stating that “a decision to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family
setting must receive equivalent protection” to abortion rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (indicating that “[m]arriage is . . . fundamental to our very existence and survival”).
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as the 1888 case of Maynard v. Hill, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the “public is deeply interested” in marriage, as it forms the
“foundation of the family.”19 The Maynard Court concluded that without
marriage there “would be neither civilization nor progress.”20 The
implication that marriage is essential to procreation and survival21 was
even more evident half a century later when the Supreme Court declared,
“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.”22 Finally, over thirty years later, the Court held that
the “decision to marry and raise [a] child in a traditional family setting
must receive equivalent protection” to the privacy rights undergirding
abortion.23
This seminal jurisprudence on marriage and the family survives in the
courts deciding today’s gay-marriage controversies.
Upholding
Nebraska’s constitutional mini-DOMA, for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found “steering heterosexual
procreation into marriage” to be a purpose so valid that it “negate[d] any
suspicion that the supporters of [the mini-DOMA] were motivated solely
by a desire to punish disadvantaged groups.”24 The Texas Court of
Appeals found that marriage laws favoring traditional couples did not
violate equal protection as heterosexuals alone possessed the “natural
ability to procreate.”25 Similarly, in attempting to restrict marriage to
“male-female couples”26 and exorcise the judiciary’s ability to change that
definition, the Hawai‘i legislature passed a law in 1994 stating that the
state’s marriage licenses were “intended to foster and protect the
propagation of the human race through male-female marriages.”27 Justice
Scalia even specified his concern over the “consequences of raising a child
in a single-sex family” during oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry,28
the gay-marriage case that accompanied Windsor during the 2013 term.
The link between marriage and children has quite frequently been
18

125 U.S. 190 (1888).
Id. at 211. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court cited Maynard to conclude that marriage was too
vital and fundamental a right to be frustrated by racial discrimination. 388 U.S. at 12.
20
125 U.S. at 211.
21
See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal
Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447,
451 (2004) (citing the Maynard Court’s words as making the connection between marriage and
procreation “axiomatic”).
22
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
23
434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
24
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 869 (8th Cir. 2006).
25
In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
26
A Bill for an Act Relating to Marriage, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, repealed by Hawaii
Marriage Equality Act of 2013.
27
Id. at 529.
28
Oral Argument at 22:05, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_144.
19
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asserted as an argument against legalized same-sex unions. Campaigning
in 2006 for a constitutional DOMA on the federal level, President George
W. Bush declared that “changing the definition of marriage would
undermine the family structure.”29 In the same year, then Senate majority
leader Bill Frist argued that “[m]arriage between one man and one woman
does a better job protecting children, better than any other institution
humankind has devised.”30
The president of the Marriage Law
Foundation, a traditional-marriage-defense group formed on the one-year
anniversary of Massachusetts’ adoption of same-sex marriage in 2003,31
wrote in 2008 that “married mother-father child-rearing [is the] mode that
indisputably correlates with the optimal outcomes” for children and
society.32
Indeed, DOMA itself was ostensibly engendered by precisely such
concerns. A 1996 House of Representatives committee report on House
Resolution 3396, which was soon to be cast into law as DOMA, explains
that society has “an interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of
heterosexual marriage because it has a deep and abiding interest in
encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing.”33 Not to be
misread, the report implores that “it is not the mere presence of love that
explains marriage” but the fact that “marriage is a relationship within
which the community socially approves and encourages sexual intercourse
and the birth of children.”34 DOMA was born—as, no doubt, were the
mini-DOMAs—out of the deep legal and social connections between
parental rights and the institution of marriage.
Hence, one reason that homosexual citizens might seek to challenge
traditional marriage restrictions is to secure the right to bring forth and
raise children. Reviewing the long-standing legal, political, and social
identification of child-rearing and marriage, a corollary principle seems to
exist: one who secures the right to bring forth and raise children also gains
a key portion of the right to marry.
III. IMPLIED PARENTAGE AND ESTOPPEL IN CHILD CUSTODY
The preceding Part shows that jurists, politicians, and commentators
have an affinity for clear biological parent-child relationships. The
elegance in child-custody law derived from such relationships cannot be
29
Deb Riechmann, Bush Pushes Amendment Banning Gay Marriage: Has Little Chance to Pass,
but Will Be Used to Rally Conservatives, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 5, 2006, at 23.
30
Laurie Kellman, Bush Steps Up Same-Sex Fight, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), June 6, 2006, at A14.
31
About the Foundation, MARRIAGE L. FOUND., http://www.marriagelawfoundation.
org/board.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
32
Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 352 (2008).
33
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 13 (1996).
34
Id. at 13–14.
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denied: he or she who physically creates children is responsible for them
and has fundamental rights over them. While same-sex marriage and
parenting may appear to upend this traditional biology-based doctrine,
plunging family law into chaos, a measured review of case law from across
the country suggests that since long before the controversies of the DOMA
era, biology has not been a controlling, or even necessary, substructure of
child-custody jurisprudence. Despite the vehement legal and political
defenses of marriage as a vehicle for creating children, child custody has
been no more reserved for married people than has procreation itself.
Since gay citizens in mini-DOMA states cannot obtain parental rights
through marriage or, often, adoption,35 courts must grapple with the issue
of whether and how to assign parentage over children emerging from
same-sex households. This problem may seem novel to some, but the
essentials of the issue existed at least as far back as the emergence of
artificial-insemination technology in the late nineteenth century.36 By the
early 1950s, babies had been artificially conceived and delivered using the
frozen sperm of deceased fathers, inevitably raising parentage questions.37
Since the advent of such possibilities, courts have routinely had to fashion
parentage doctrines without traditional biological or statutory guideposts
directing them. In 1963, for example, Stanley Gursky, a New York
husband divorcing his wife, asked a court to declare that his marriage had
produced no issue though his wife had given birth to a daughter conceived
by artificial insemination with donor sperm.38 Despite insisting that a child
so conceived was illegitimate, the court held the husband liable for the
child’s support under an equitable-estoppel theory: the wife had “changed
her position to her detriment” based on her husband’s “consent” to the
insemination,39 creating an “implied contract to support.”40 Forty-eight

35
These states include Mississippi, Utah, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2004) (stating “[a]doption by couples of the same
gender is prohibited”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (2012) (barring adoption by anyone
“cohabitating in a relationship that is not legally valid” in Utah, such as a same-sex relationship);
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (barring adoption of child by a parent’s
same-sex partner); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002) (same); Boseman v.
Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010) (same); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (same); In re Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680, 686 (Wis. 1994)
(same).
36
The first medically conducted artificial insemination in the United States apparently occurred in
Philadelphia in 1884 when a Professor Pancoast inseminated the (unconscious and unwitting) wife of
an infertile wealthy merchant with semen collected from a medical student.
Artificial Insemination, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/371
34/artifical-insemination (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
37
Kara W. Swanson, The Birth of the Sperm Bank, 71 ANNALS OF IOWA 241, 241 (2012).
38
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
39
Id. at 412.
40
Id.
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years before same-sex marriage would become legal in New York, a New
York court had declared a non-biological, non-adoptive parent legally
responsible for a child based solely on that parent’s express wish to take on
that role.
The Gursky court was clearly concerned about holding actors
accountable for their promises to serve as parents.42 That concern
reverberates through similar cases in the years that follow, as does the
similar solution of implying parenthood where it may not be, under
traditional definitions, obvious. In 1968, the California Supreme Court
sustained the criminal conviction for nonsupport of a man who had
consented to the artificial insemination of his wife.43 Eleven years later, a
California appellate court estopped a putative parent from denying he was
a six-year-old boy’s father after he had “intended [the boy] to accept and
act upon such representation.”44 The trend continues in 2013: upon a trial
court’s finding that a divorcing father “knowingly and voluntarily
consent[ed]” to artificial insemination, the Indiana Court of Appeals
recently held the man liable to support the children of his marriage.45 This
estoppel-type approach has even been applied to hold both spouses legally
responsible after they employed a surrogate mother to bring forth a child
genetically related to neither of them.46 The sole member of the triad not
held legally responsible was the surrogate, the only person biologically
related to the child.47
It bears noting that mini-DOMA states are represented in the list of
jurisdictions willing to assign parentage without a showing of biological or
adoptive liability. In 1987, South Carolina’s highest court confirmed that a
husband’s “knowledge of and assistance in” his wife’s insemination made
him the legal father of the offspring resulting.48 In Arkansas, given his
consent to insemination and his wife’s detrimental reliance on it, a husband
was estopped from denying the children of his marriage.49 A husband in
41
Same-sex marriage became legal in New York State in 2011. See Marriage Equality Act, 2011
N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (A. 8354) (McKinney) (defining marriage as valid between parties of “the same or
different sex”).
42
242 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
43
People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 497, 501–02 (Cal. 1968).
44
In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123–24 (Ct. App. 1979).
45
Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 328–29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
46
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 294 (Ct. App. 1998).
47
Id. at 288, 288 n.12.
48
In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987). South Carolina is a mini-DOMA state that
prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute. See S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15
(declaring that heterosexual marriage is “the only lawful domestic union” in South Carolina); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (1996) (declaring same-sex marriages “void ab initio”).
49
Brown v. Brown, 125 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). Arkansas is a mini-DOMA state
that prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1
(“Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.”); id. 83, § 2 (allowing recognition
of out-of-state heterosexual common-law marriages but denying recognition to any other out-of-state
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Kansas was estopped from evading parentage after giving artificialinsemination consent to his wife’s physician,50 and an Oregon man failed
to sway an appeals court that his consent to insemination should not be
binding if it had not been reduced to writing.51
Finally, estoppel doctrine has been employed in cases similar to those
above but by the opposite parties: husbands who have held themselves out
as fathers of children not their genetic offspring, who sought nonetheless to
establish parental rights. As early as 1948, a New York trial court refused
a wife’s request to deny visitation for her separated husband to their child
born of artificial insemination.52 The court reasoned that the husband’s
consent to the procedure involved the same custody considerations as that
of an adoptive parent.53 Twenty-five years later, a New York court again
bolstered the rights of non-biological parents by declaring that the consent
of an ex-husband who was genetically unrelated to his ex-wife’s daughter
was nevertheless required prior to the adoption of that daughter by another
man.54
These cases show that in states both red and blue, in mini-DOMA and
marriage-equality jurisdictions alike, courts have made establishing
parentage a priority. The dual judicial imperatives of providing the best
possible care for the child and avoiding the appearance on state-support
rolls of parentless waifs are simultaneously served each time a prospective
parent is estopped from denying her or his non-biological child. As these
cases suggest, these dual imperatives have the power to trump traditional
morality, religious instruction, individual liberty, and state statutory law to
create non-traditional parents when and where such parents serve state
interests. This dynamic can also be reversed to empower parents to
establish non-traditional custody over their purported children. In each of
quasi-marital unions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (1997) (statutorily banning same-sex marriage and
preempting recognition of same-sex marriages from other states).
50
R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 925, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). Kansas is a mini-DOMA state that
prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution and by statute. See KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16
(declaring all marriages other than one man to one woman “contrary to the public policy” and “void”);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2501 (2007) (defining marriage as between parties “of opposite sex”); see also
Id. § 23-2508 (declaring full faith and credit for all valid out-of-state marriages in its first sentence but
then precluding recognition of any similarly valid same-sex union in its second).
51
In re Marriage of A.C.H. & D.R.H., 210 P.3d 929, 933 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). Oregon is a miniDOMA state that prohibits same-sex marriage under its constitution. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (“It is
the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.”). However, as of late 2013, Oregon does
recognize same-sex marriages certified in other states, making its mini-DOMA perhaps the weakest in
the nation. See Scott Hewitt, Same-Sex Oregon Couples Flock to Clark County to Wed, COLUMBIAN,
Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/nov/24/gay-same-sex-marriage-Oregon-ClarkCounty/ (documenting same-sex Oregon couples’ marrying out-of-state to secure in-state recognition).
52
78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 390–91 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
53
Id.
54
In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
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these cases, as in the cases of many same-sex partners seeking child
custody in mini-DOMA states today, neither genetics nor adoption
established parentage. Still, courts inferred a parental relationship from
circumstances—circumstances very similar to those in the dissolutions of
same-sex unions occurring every day in post-DOMA/mini-DOMA
America.
IV. THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Article IV of the U.S. Constitution requires that each state afford
meaning and enforcement—full faith and credit—to the judicial
proceedings of every other state.55 Still, the U.S. Supreme Court has long
held that only a “final judgment . . . qualifies for recognition throughout
the land.”56 Yet the almost universal parlance for a motion addressing the
custody of a child is a modification: it is axiomatic that as children grow
and circumstances evolve, a change in custody conditions may be needed
to protect the child’s best interests. Since child-custody/visitation orders
are, therefore, never final, they had escaped the full-faith-and-credit
requirement until, in Thompson v. Thompson,57 the Supreme Court noted
that by 1980, as many as 100,000 children may have been kidnapped by
non-custodial parents and transported into friendlier jurisdictions.58 As
Professor Roger Baron acknowledged, “The losing party in the custody
litigation would much prefer to avoid having a modification hearing before
the same court which has once already ruled in favor of the opposing
side.”59
Congress, which is empowered to dictate the terms of full faith and
credit,60 responded with a federal act to curb the “national epidemic of
parental kidnapping.”61 The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(“PKPA”), was enacted with a provision entitled “Full Faith and Credit
Given to Child Custody Determinations.”62 The Act intones that only one
55

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
57
484 U.S. 174 (1988).
58
Id. at 181.
59
Roger M. Baron, Child Custody Jurisdiction, 38 S.D. L. REV. 479, 485 (1993).
60
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
61
Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180–81.
62
Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8, 94 Stat. 3568, 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012)). The
PKPA had been preceded by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), a model state law
recommended by, among others, the American Bar Association. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of
Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1207 n.1 (1969). The UCCJA’s slow, piecemeal adoption by state
legislatures rendered it largely ineffective as a uniform standard. The PKPA was intended to create the
single American standard the UCCJA had failed to engender. Linda M. DeMelis, Note, Interstate
56
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state—the home state of an affected child—can rule on custody, disallows
minimum-contacts attempts to get around this pronouncement, and
requires that courts outside the child’s home state fully honor the custody
decrees of the home state.63 While doubts exist about the precise
effectiveness of the PKPA,64 its essential success in preempting state law
to establish a single controlling forum for each custody case has been clear
for decades.65
Thanks to the success of the PKPA, one essential element of
marriage—child custody—is afforded national, uniform enforcement that
marriage rights themselves are not. While regulatory issues such as the
delineation of incest, the age of consent, and pre-remarriage waiting
periods have kept marriage squarely within the public-policy exception to
the full faith and credit clause,66 the PKPA wrenches child custody out of
that exception and prevents a state from choosing to apply its own law over
those of other states that have already made a valid custody adjudication.
Most mini-DOMAs are, at heart, state choice-of-law provisions rejecting
the marital experiments of other states. A law such as the PKPA, which in
one stroke denies state choice of law and touches directly on an issue as
deeply embedded in marriage policy as child custody, is therefore capable
of sending significant shudders through state same-sex parenting
jurisprudence in mini-DOMA fiefs.
The PKPA’s effects have been clearly demonstrated in Virginia, a
mini-DOMA battleground.67 By a strong margin, Virginians voted to add
an amendment banning same-sex marriage to their state constitution in
2006.68 Given the judicial adoption of gay marriage in Massachusetts three

Child Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National
Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1329, 1330 (1994).
63
See DeMelis, supra note 62, at 1336 (explicating the strictures of the PKPA).
64
See id. at 1330 (suggesting the PKPA is a “[q]ualified [s]uccess” though states continue to
“differ in their interpretations of [its] jurisdictional rules”).
65
See, e.g., Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction
Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REV. 885, 912 (1993) (claiming that the PKPA worked “wonderfully well” in
establishing full faith and credit for custody decrees).
66
See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1969–70 (1997) (reviewing the exception as applied to marriage
and states’ occasional refusals to recognize one another’s marriages).
67
For examples beyond the Virginia cases discussed here where the PKPA was used in state
choice-of-law situations, see Perez v. Tanner, 965 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1998); Cann v. Howard, 850
S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); Atkins v. Atkins, 623 So.2d 239, 243 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Potter v.
Potter, 505 S.E.2d 147, 152 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); State ex rel Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 130
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Larry R.W. v. Alan F.S. (In re Custody of Kit S.), 537 N.W.2d 30, 32–33 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995).
68
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; see also Chris L. Jenkins, Ban on Same-Sex Unions Added to Va.
Constitution, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A46 (explaining that the Virginia constitutional ban
“passed easily”).
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years earlier, the ballot measure was largely supported as a means of
insulating the state’s statutory mini-DOMA, which had existed since 1997
and was augmented with a second statute in 2004, from judicial review.70
Virginia’s resulting mini-DOMA was particularly strict: it not only banned
same-sex marriages and civil unions and disallowed their recognition when
created in other states, but it further specified that any contractual rights
devolving from such unions would be void within Virginia’s borders.71 On
the very day this enhanced 2004 mini-DOMA statute became law, a
mother fleeing a same-sex relationship in Vermont filed a petition in a
Virginia trial court to have her former partner stripped of any parental
rights,72 pitting the new mini-DOMA against the PKPA.
This story began in Falls Church, Virginia, where Lisa Miller and Janet
Jenkins met and started a romantic relationship in 1997.73 Three years
later, they entered a civil union in Vermont, melded their family names
(hence, the Virginia case is Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins74), and decided
to start a family via artificial insemination.75 With Jenkins’ participation
and support, Miller gave birth to a daughter and the couple moved to
Vermont full time so that they could raise the child in a state that endorsed
their relationship.76 About one year later, when the couple separated, a
Vermont court issued an initial order granting physical custody over the
daughter to Miller and visitation to Jenkins.77 Less than one month later,
Miller took the child back to Virginia and filed a request to render any
custody claims by Jenkins “nugatory, void, illegal, and/or
unenforceable,”78 echoing the language of the state’s just-enacted 2004
69
Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Tasha Robertson &
Steve Friess, Gay Marriage Decision Spurs Action Across U.S., BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 28, 2003, at A1
(noting that the “ripple effect” of the Massachusetts decision was “being felt from Arizona to
Wisconsin, from New Jersey to Nevada”).
70
See Chris L. Jenkins, As Campaign Days Dwindle, Marriage Issue Heats Up in Va.; N.J.
Ruling Sparks Action on Amendment Question, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2006, at B01 (noting that
“supporters say the amendment is necessary to protect against activist judges” such as those “in
Massachusetts in 2003”); Jenkins, supra note 68 (suggesting that statutes prohibiting gay unions were
seen by traditional-marriage supporters as insufficient to prevent judicial action allowing same-sex
unions in Virginia); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1997) (banning same-sex marriages and
disallowing recognition of such marriages from other states); id. § 20-45.3 (2004) (banning all same
sex-sex unions, partnerships, or similar arrangements and voiding all effects of such unions irrespective
of their state of origin).
71
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.2 to .3; Jenkins, supra note 68.
72
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
73
Erik Eckholm, Which Mother for Isabella? Civil Union Ends in an Abduction and Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1.
74
Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 330.
75
Eckholm, supra note 73.
76
Id.
77
Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332.
78
Id.
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79

mini-DOMA.
The Virginia trial court conceded, declaring Miller the
girl’s “sole biological and natural parent.”80
Still, the Vermont courts persisted in their claim of jurisdiction,
invoking the PKPA and repining of Virginia’s statutory incapacity to
decide issues arising out of a civil union.81 Defending her position before
the Virginia Court of Appeals, Miller specifically made Section 2 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act—the states’-powers provision that
remains in place today82—the centerpiece of her argument, claiming that
DOMA “effectively trump[ed] the PKPA.”83 The court roundly rejected
this argument, ruling that DOMA did not repeal the PKPA, did not conflict
with the PKPA, and did nothing to disturb a custody order properly
executed by an out-of-state court.84 As to Virginia’s 2004 mini-DOMA
bar of rights derived from out-of-state same-sex relationships, the court
curtly held that the mini-DOMA either did not apply or was “preempted by
the PKPA.”85 Virtually from its beginning, then, one of the most drastic
anti-same-sex-rights statutes in the country was unable to undermine an
out-of-state custody decision based on a same-sex-union statute. Janet
Jenkins could not have married Lisa Miller in Virginia, but she was able to
assert her parental rights over Miller’s biological offspring there with the
full support of the local appellate courts.
From the point of view of marriage-equality activists, a case like
Miller-Jenkins is compelling for the headlines it can generate, but it is
perhaps most important for its subtle precedential effects. There is
evidence of such effects in the 2009 Virginia Court of Appeals decision in
Prashad v. Copeland.86 The case was a child-custody dispute between a
gay couple, to whom a North Carolina court had granted primary
custody,87 and the surrogate who had given birth to their child in
Minnesota.88 The surrogate, who was in a heterosexual marriage,
attempted to challenge the North Carolina order in Virginia, relying in part
on identical arguments to those made by Lisa Miller: that DOMA “trumps
the PKPA” and that Virginia’s 2004 mini-DOMA prevents recognition of
79
See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (“Any such civil union, partnership contract or other
arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”).
80
Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332.
81
Id. at 333. The parallel Vermont case is Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt.
2006).
82
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stating full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for
same-sex marriages not required under the remaining federal DOMA provisions).
83
Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 336.
84
Id. at 337.
85
Id.
86
685 S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
87
Id. at 201–02.
88
Id. at 201.
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the couple’s custody decree.
The court sidestepped the invitation
altogether, holding that it in no way needed to recognize the marriage to
recognize the child custody created in North Carolina.90
In sum, in 2006, the Virginia Court of Appeals used the PKPA to
uphold the visitation rights of a lesbian parent to her partner’s biological
daughter. In 2009, the same statute led the court to confirm that two gay
men have superior custody rights to those of their child’s biological
heterosexual mother. Thus, cases like Prashad and Miller-Jenkins
demonstrate the PKPA’s relevance as a tool in LGBT legal campaigns.
Janet Jenkins’ legal victory was pyrrhic; her case ended in the
abduction, transportation, and disappearance of her child.91 Such an
ending casts light on the imperatives behind the PKPA, on society’s
collective wish to see children safely and civilly settled. Certainly, the
decisions in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins and Prashad v. Copeland
need not be interpreted as anything more than what settled law
demanded.92 Possibly, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals’ refusal,
even in dicta, to take up the mantras of state sovereignty and traditionalmarriage defense, and its clear willingness to sidestep those issues and
allow the PKPA to function unfettered, shows an ordering of priorities in
which the concern for children apparently outweighs concerns over their
parents’ lifestyles. Whether strictly in a legal sense or perhaps within a
deeper social context, the PKPA serves to empower the members of samesex relationships even where those relationships themselves have never
been legally cognizable.
V. SAME-SEX PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THREE
CONTRASTING MINI-DOMA STATES
This Note now turns to examine whether same-sex partners’ parental
rights have actually been bolstered by de facto parentage and PKPA
89

Id. at 202, 206–07.
Id. at 207.
91
Miller, who became a deeply religious conservative, repeatedly frustrated visitation, resulting in
contempt convictions in the Vermont courts. Eckholm, supra note 73. In 2008, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in her fight against Vermont. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 555
U.S. 888, 888 (2008). In September 2009, she absconded with her daughter to a Mennonite settlement
in Nicaragua. Eckholm, supra note 73. After the arrest of a pastor for his role in the kidnapping,
Miller and the girl disappeared and are believed to be at large in Nicaragua still. Id. It may be
tempting to say that this turn of events describes a need for greater equality in child-custody for samesex relationships, but as both pro- and anti-marriage-equality state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court
concurred in the enforcement, the resolution may be more a reflection of the sad reality of equality
achieved, with a same-sex partner losing touch with her child not because of legal barriers but because
of the legal system’s incapacity to control events in the roiling seascape of intra-family law.
92
See, e.g., Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1474, 1478 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming that the PKPA
trumps state law and mandating Virginia’s continuing to control the case despite the mother’s securing
custody modifications from a North Carolina court).
90
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applications in state case law. To answer that question from a broad
perspective, three long-time mini-DOMA states that are geographically
dispersed and culturally dissimilar are examined: Illinois, Montana, and
Alabama. The anti-gay-marriage policies of these states, and the ways in
which those policies have or have not resulted in changes to gay-parenting
rulings in the state courts, raise questions about the capacity of any state in
2014 to embargo same-sex family rights completely.
A. Case Law and Statutory Developments in Illinois
Both geographically and politically, Illinois sits amidst the nation. Its
demographics, political history, and civic culture defy simple red-blue
classification. Political statisticians divide the state into three regions:
Chicago/Cook County, the state’s key population center and a Democratic
stronghold; the “collar counties,” five suburban jurisdictions ringing
Chicagoland; and “downstate,” an immense swath of territory comprising
ninety-six counties, the southernmost of which are twice as close to
Mississippi’s borders as they are to Chicago’s.93 The dynamic pitting
liberal-leaning, populous upstate counties against conservative-minded
rural counties downstate has led to a historically purple jurisdiction: in the
twenty years from 1968 to 1988, Illinois voted for the Republican
candidate in every presidential election; in the two decades from 1992
onward, it has voted for the Democrat each time.94
In accord with its conservative legacy, Illinois firmly rejected samesex marriage. It passed three statutory mini-DOMA provisions in 1996,
adding same-sex marriage to its enumerated list of prohibited marriages,95
enacting a separate statute declaring same-sex marriage “contrary to the
public policy of this State,”96 and adding, as contemplated in the second
section of the federal DOMA,97 a component barring recognition in Illinois
of same-sex marriages legally contracted in other states.98 Perhaps
characteristically given its lack of political orthodoxy, Illinois never
cemented its mini-DOMA regime in a constitutional amendment. Still, the
mini-DOMA was sufficiently strong to deny surviving-spouse inheritance
93
Micah Cohen, Political Geography: Illinois, N.Y. TIMES FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Mar. 20,
2012,
8:35
AM)
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/political-geographyillinois/?_php=true&type=blogs&_r=1.
94
Illinois Election Results, U.S. ELECTION ATLAS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/
state.php?fips=17&off=99 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
95
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a)(5) (West 1996) (prohibiting “a marriage between 2
individuals of the same sex”).
96
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (West 1996).
97
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (denying full-faith-and-credit interstate treatment for same-sex
marriages under federal DOMA).
98
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (West 1996) (“Prohibited marriages void if contracted in
another state.”).
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rights to a same-sex partner after an eight-year committed relationship—
foreshadowing the issues in Windsor that would lead to DOMA’s demise
in the summer of 2013.99
The Illinois mini-DOMA also had a direct effect on child-custody
issues. For instance, in In re C.B.L.,100 a lesbian brought suit after being
denied contact with her putative child since the end of an eleven-year
relationship with the child’s biological mother.101 Although the petitioner
had participated “dutifully” in the artificial insemination, birth, and rearing
of the child, the court found the petitioner had no basis on which to ask for
visitation as she fit none of the categories listed in the state’s marital
statute.102 By the time she reached the appeals court, the petitioner had
already given up any claim under the state’s marriage laws and was
pursuing a de facto parent-theory103 of the sort that has worked in
numerous cases to create parentage where biology and adoption were not
available.104 The Illinois Appellate Court rejected implied parentage as a
strategy for advancing LGBT parental rights and ultimately supported the
Illinois mini-DOMA.
Six years later, in In re Marriage of Simmons,105 the same appeals
court denied any basis for a child-custody petition to a transgender man
who, though born female, had lived as a male his entire adult life, taken
testosterone for decades, undergone partial sex-reassignment surgery,
obtained an Illinois birth-certificate modification listing him as “male,” and
married a woman in a certified Cook County ceremony.106 After six years,
the couple mutually decided to have a baby via artificial insemination, and
the petitioner was duly listed as the child’s father on its birth certificate.107
Despite the marriage, the clear implied-parentage arguments, and the
evidence of the birth certificate, upon the couple’s dissolution the court
held that the petitioner was not a parent of the child, as he, a legal
female,108 had never actually been a husband.109 While the Illinois
Parentage Act110 gives a consenting husband full paternal rights over a
99
In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 207–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see also United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
100
723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
101
Id. at 317.
102
Id. at 317, 320–21.
103
Id. at 318.
104
See supra Part III (tracing the use of estoppel and implied parentage to establish parental
rights).
105
825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
106
Id. at 306–07.
107
Id. at 307.
108
The Court referred to the petitioner throughout using male pronouns for, it said, “respect” and
with “no legal significance.” Id. at 306 n.1.
109
Id. at 315.
110
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1–40/3 (West 1992).
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child created by artificial insemination, the court held it could not be
applied to the petitioner.111
Both facts and timing suggest the Marriage of Simmons Court may
have ruled with an eye to preserving the heterosexual clarity in the
language of the Illinois mini-DOMA. By the time the case was decided,
the Illinois Supreme Court had already, in the 2003 case In re Parentage of
M.J.,112 faced a similar scenario involving a heterosexual couple. A man
involved in a love affair with a woman gave his consent, encouragement,
and support to her efforts to have a child by means of artificial
insemination with donor sperm.113 When the procedure produced twins,
the man initially supported the new family but, upon the couple’s breaking
up, stopped doing so.114 The case involved the mother’s attempt to obtain
child support—analogous to the Marriage of Simmons petitioner’s attempt
to establish child visitation—based on the same Illinois Parentage Act.115
The court held that because the mother had failed to get the father’s written
consent to the artificial insemination, she could not mount a claim under
the Act.116
It would appear, then, that the traditional couple and non-traditional
couple were dealt with identically in that neither could succeed under the
Act. But that reading overlooks two critical differences. First, the
transgender petitioner in Marriage of Simmons in fact had executed written
consent at a fertility clinic in full accord with the Parentage Act’s
strictures,117 yet still he was denied the parental status that would have
been granted to the Parentage of M.J. petitioner had she possessed the
same documentation. Second, the Illinois Supreme Court did not
ultimately rule against the Parentage of M.J. petitioner. Despite finding
that the Parentage Act did not advance the petitioner’s claim, the court held
that she could still pursue her case for child-support payments “based on
common law theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel.”118 The
state’s high court took pains to show that the Parentage Act did not
preclude implied-parent doctrine and that the legislature wanted the
common law to continue establishing parentage whenever possible.119 Yet
two years later, a lower court failed to offer this second-chance solution to
111

Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 315.
787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003).
113
Id. at 146.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 147.
116
Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150.
117
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
118
Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150, 152.
119
See id. at 151 (examining three sections of the Illinois Parentage Act and finding “nothing to
prohibit common law actions to establish parental responsibility, and the state’s public policy
considerations support a finding in favor of allowing common law actions”).
112
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the transgender Marriage of Simmons petitioner, as he resided in what that
court considered a same-sex relationship.120 Especially in contrast with
Parentage of M.J., the 2005 Marriage of Simmons decision shows not only
the legal but possibly the prejudicial effects of a mini-DOMA that elevates
some relationships and denies status to others.
Jurisprudence evolved. Ten years earlier—one year prior to the miniDOMA’s enactment—the same court produced an opinion that was much
friendlier to LGBT family rights in In re Petition of K.M. That court had
interpreted Illinois’ adoption statutes liberally to allow “unmarried persons
. . . regardless of sex or sexual orientation, to petition for adoption
jointly.”121 This decision allowed two different lesbian couples to begin
families under Illinois law pending hearings on whether the adoptions
would have been in the best interests of the children.122 As these secondparent adoptions were sanctioned by the state, the same-sex partners were
assured of custody rights (and faced with support obligations) even if their
unrecognized unions broke up. It is possible to read this decision, cast into
case law on the eve of the mini-DOMA, as an undercurrent of openness to
same-sex parenting in Illinois’ courts, an impulse that was then repressed
in decisions like In re C.B.L. and In re Marriage of Simmons during the
mini-DOMA era.
If that interpretation is true, equality in parenting was an undercurrent
that would resurface in time. The facts of Connor v. Velinda C.123 show
the willingness of an Illinois court to put a child’s best interests ahead of
biology in making a custody determination. When an unwed teen gave
birth to a daughter, the teen’s mother, Velinda, and the mother’s female
partner, Barbara, jointly adopted the baby,124 in the mode contemplated by
the Petition of K.M. case above. Though Velinda and Barbara’s apparent
intention was to raise the baby at home with its biological mother and, in
time, reverse the adoption to return custody to the natural parent, a custody
struggle ensued when Velinda and Barbara separated.125 Relying on a case
from the early 1990s, the court held that the custody-fitness factors in the
marital Act applied to the women’s situation, even if they were not legally
permitted to marry.126 Given the vexed and volatile nature of life in
120
See Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 313 (“In the instant case, equitable estoppel cannot
apply because no action on the part of respondent can confer standing on petitioner to seek custody.”).
121
In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
122
Id. at 890–91, 899.
123
826 N.E.2d 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
124
Id. at 1266–67.
125
Velinda C., 826 N.E.2d at 1266–67.
126
Id. at 1271 (citing Hall v. Hall, 589 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). While they
cohabited and adopted a child together, the nature of the women’s relationship is not clear. The baby’s
natural grandmother/adoptive mother did invoke the Illinois mini-DOMA in attempting to persuade the
court that the unfavorable marital law did not apply, ostensibly meaning to characterize her relationship
with her partner as a would-be same-sex marriage. Id. Still, within two years of adopting the child, the
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Velinda’s home, a trial court awarded, and the appeals court affirmed,
custody over the daughter to Barbara.128 The court relied on a marriagedissolution statute to justify taking a child out of its biological mother’s
home, away from its biological grandmother’s custody, and placing it in
the permanent care of a same-sex partner who, under the mini-DOMA,
could not have formed a marriage to dissolve.
Strikingly, the Marriage of Simmons and Connor v. Velinda C. cases
both occurred in 2005 and both in the Illinois Appellate Court. Equally
strikingly, where the Marriage of Simmons Court declined to find any basis
on which the transgender parent could assert a custody claim over a child
he helped create and rear, the Velinda C. Court, without fraught, allowed a
biologically and matrimonially unrelated life partner to take custody. The
dissonance in the decisions is most easily resolved by noting that the nonbiological partner in Velinda C. was a legal adoptive parent.129 As is
hinted at in the Virginia case law, however, the different outcomes may
also be the result of the court’s reasoning that the best interests of the child
trumped the state’s condemnation of same-sex marriage.130 It is possible
that since the court in Marriage of Simmons was satisfied that the offspring
was safe in its biological mother’s care, it demurred to the mini-DOMA
and refused to consider an equitable implication of parentage.131 Faced,
however, with the prospect of a child growing up in a home beset by risk
and instability, the Velinda C. Court chose to overlook any mini-DOMA
complications and rest custody in the non-biological partner.132 In 2005, it
partner had married a man. Id. at 1269. The Court does not address the question of whether the
women had, claimed to have had, or could have had a same-sex union of any kind.
127
This volatility included financial difficulty, suicide attempts, self-harming behaviors,
prescription-drug abuse, and the lingering effects of sexual abuse on members of the household. Id. at
1267.
128
Id. at 1273.
129
Id. at 1266.
130
See supra Part IV (concluding by positing that the Virginia Court of Appeals may have put
concern for children’s welfare ahead of the state’s position against same-sex marriage).
131
See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (noting that the court refused to countenance
equitable estoppel for a plaintiff from a same-sex relationship).
132
This hypothesis can also explain the dissonant decisions in Marriage of Simmons and
Parentage of M.J. The latter case dealt with an already married man who, for ten years, assumed a
false identity and started a second family with the unsuspecting petitioner. In re Parentage of M.J., 787
N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ill. 2003). Upon being exposed, he attempted to escape all liability for that second
family. Id. Faced with a scoundrel who proposed to leave his children bereft, the Court quickly saw its
way to the secondary solution of parentage by estoppel. Id. at 152. Facing no such compulsion in
Marriage of Simmons, the Court perhaps felt liberated to enforce the mini-DOMA as strictly as
possible. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text. The Court in Marriage of Simmons largely
endorses this hypothesis, stating that estoppel of the Parentage of M.J. variety may be applied to
petitions for child-support payments but not to establish parental custody or visitation rights. In re
Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). If the biological mother in Marriage
of Simmons had been destitute and needed the transgendered father’s assistance to keep the children off
state support, or if the father had been attempting to evade child-support duties instead of establishing
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is tempting to say that Illinois disallowed same-sex marriages but
condoned same-sex-parentage when it protected the state’s interest in child
welfare.
By the end of 2013, Illinois’ same-sex-parenting dynamic would be
revolutionized both jurisprudentially and in public law. In 2012, with the
case of In re T.P.S.,133 the Illinois Appellate Court would again address the
issues raised by Marriage of Simmons, with contrasting results. In a
pattern familiar in this Note, two lesbian partners in a long-term
relationship agreed to pursue a pregnancy by artificial insemination
resulting in two children whom the couple raised coequally but without
establishing legal adoption.134 The partners broke up, the biological
mother denied all contact with the girls to her former partner, and that
partner filed an action to obtain parental rights.135 In a decision that
mirrors the Marriage of Simmons resolution, the trial court dismissed the
partner’s petition with prejudice, leaving the biological mother as the only
legal parent of the girls.136
The appeals court, however, reversed. Upending a crucial rule posited
in Marriage of Simmons, the court held that “common law contract and
promissory estoppel causes of action for custody and visitation” could be
asserted by a petitioning “nonbiological parent.”137 This is precisely the
rule that had been requested by the Marriage of Simmons father without
success,138 a rule that denudes the mini-DOMA of authority in childcustody situations. Without benefit of biology, adoption, or marriage, a
purported parent in Illinois can nonetheless establish the right of custody or
visitation over his or her child, just as the state can establish her or his duty
of support, with parentage implied by estoppel. At the end of 2012, Illinois
was still a mini-DOMA jurisdiction, but its courts had granted same-sex
partners the same rights in relation to their children that the state’s married
citizens enjoyed.
In 2013, the Illinois legislature took the ultimate step and abandoned
the mini-DOMA altogether.139 By votes of thirty-two to twenty-one in the
state Senate and sixty-one to fifty-four in the state House, Illinois became
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the fifteenth state to usher in same-sex marriage.
In Illinois, at least, the
evolving position of the judiciary on LGBT child-custody rights appears to
have matched an evolution in public (and hence legislative) support,
making the state a potential model for marriage-equality activists. The
Petition of K.M. case pointed to a preexisting judicial openness to samesex family rights that—though stymied for some seventeen years—was
capable of revivification as the public’s mood and demographic make-up
changed. The Illinois case study calls for locating the preexisting
sympathies of lawmakers, enduring the setbacks of early cases, and over
time making a subtle but persuasive showing of the need for and benefits
accruing to society from same-sex parents in state-sanctioned marriages.
That case study, however, should be embraced with caution: Illinois
may not be a model for the nation. As Illinois’ mini-DOMA was never
enshrined in its state constitution, repeal was procedurally much less
complicated than it will or would be in the majority of states banning
same-sex marriage. Further, despite Illinois’ potential conservative
leanings, the state sits neither in the Mountain West nor the Deep South.
The undercurrent of sympathy supporting same-sex parenting in Illinois
may never have been manifest at all in more conservative states, making
the challenge one of creation rather than resuscitation. This Note now
moves west and south to examine such creation’s chances.
B. Case Law Developments in Montana
If Illinois is tightly woven into the center of American society,
Montana is, according to one historian, defined by “isolation, rugged land,
severe weather, and small population.”141 Even the state’s name, derived
from a Latinate adjective meaning “mountainous,”142 seems to tout
harshness, remoteness, and solitude. Given its geographic aloofness and
historically extraction-based economy,143 one might assume Montana
would be among the reddest of states, and, indeed, all but twice since 1952
Montana has given its Electoral College votes to the Republican ticket.144
Yet a palpable legacy of frontier independence may be detected in its
politics: while its state legislature boasts strong G.O.P. majorities in both
140
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CHI. SUN-TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.suntimes.com/23558841-418/gay-marriage-bill-passes-inillinois-house.html.
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chambers, its two U.S. senators are Democrats, as is its governor.147
John Patrick Williams, an eighteen-year Montana Congressman, described
the region’s politics toward the end of the twentieth century by saying,
“For one hundred years the West’s political pendulum had swung
consistently between Democrats and Republicans.”148
There is evidence of such independent thinking in Montanans’ history
of shirking tradition and custom to forge their own solutions to social and
family challenges. It was “common among rural and working-class
women in Montana well into the twentieth century” to give birth at home
assisted only by “neighbors, midwives, and husbands.”149 With the dearth
of “ministers, priests, and rabbis” in Montana for much of its history, the
territorial government authorized a range of public officials to conduct
wedding ceremonies, and the law liberally sanctioned common-law
marriages so long as they had been recognized by the public.150
Even so, liberality has its boundaries. The “West” depicted by
Congressman Williams is the American “Mountain West,” an eight-state
region151 where seven states (including Montana) have mini-DOMAs, five
(including Montana) have both statutory and constitutional mini-DOMAs,
and only one has legalized same-sex marriage.152 Despite its legacy of
tolerating self-help solutions where marriage and children are concerned,153
Montana has also manifested an abiding desire to bring matrimony into
conformity with societal mores. Both in the late nineteenth century and
again in the Great Depression, campaigns sprang up to ban common-law
marriage in Montana.154 While these campaigns failed to change the law,
Martha Kohl notes their cultural success: “regardless of the legality of
145
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common-law marriages, couples wanted official sanction.”
The
Montana legislature has instituted various waiting periods prior to marriage
licensure in a fruitless effort to reduce cohabitation and divorce,156 and
Montana’s highest court defended the institution by naming married—or
even merely engaged—persons a “protected class” for civil-rights
purposes.157 Most relevant to this Note, Montana has prohibited same-sex
marriage statutorily158 and in 2004 via constitutional amendment.159
Still, it is the thesis of this Note that even where the most fundamental
laws clearly disallow same-sex marriage, same-sex partners can sometimes
establish equal civil rights to their heterosexual counterparts. For example,
in Snetsinger v. Montana University System,160 two lesbian couples, each
with a partner employed by the defendant, challenged the Montana
University System’s policy of subsidizing spousal benefits to marital and
heterosexual common-law spouses of employees, but not to same-sex
partners.161 The court held that a “policy of denying health benefits to
unmarried same-sex couples while granting the benefits to unmarried
opposite-sex couples results in a denial of equal protection.”162 While the
court stressed “what this case is not about”—Montana’s marriage laws—
and insisted that granting a same-sex couple equal standing to a legally
recognized common-law couple did not equate to a right to common-law
marriage for same-sex partners, it is hard to see how the holding does not
create a quasi-marital status.163 In a state statutorily set against gay
marriage and in a year when its voters would cast that opposition into
constitutional authority, same-sex partners won in court a significant social
benefit previously thought reserved to heterosexual couples.
Similar victories have occurred for LGBT legal activists where
Montanan child-custody issues are concerned, in decisions perhaps more
plausible from a Massachusetts or California court than one in a miniDOMA jurisdiction. In the case of In re L.F.A.,164 a biological mother
155
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argued that only biology or adoption could establish parentage under
Montana law, meaning her erstwhile same-sex partner had no claim to
visitation with the three children they had raised together.165 The Montana
Supreme Court, however, endorsed a trial court finding that the nonbiological mother had sufficiently acted as a parent to the children to
obtain in loco parentis status,166 largely echoing the estoppel-parentage
doctrines discussed in Part III of this Note. On finding that keeping the
non-biological, non-adoptive parent as a part of the children’s lives was in
their best interest, the court approved a parenting arrangement that
alternated custody between the two mothers.167 This split-custody
arrangement shows that courts may not read the mini-DOMA as an
overriding social condemnation of same-sex relationships in the way that
Virginia’s ternary mini-DOMA apparently intended.168 Rather, just as the
court treated same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples equally in
Snetsinger,169 the court here treated a non-biological homosexual parent the
same as a biological or heterosexual one, allowing her an equal chance to
prove her implied parentage.
Lest this case be read as an anomaly, the contemporaneous controversy
in Kulstad v. Maniaci170 confirms, and perhaps extends, the court’s
approach. Kulstad is the case of two women who cohabited, exchanged
rings, and represented themselves as partners, despite the absence of a
same-sex legal institution under state law.171 Over time, the partners
adopted two children, portraying themselves as co-parents during a “home
study” with social workers prior to each adoption.172 Although only one of
the women became the legal adoptive mother, both women played full and
active roles in raising the children, functioning, in the court’s words,
“much like any other two-parent family.”173 Upon the dissolution of their
union, the adoptive mother fought—as the biological mother had in In re
L.F.A.—to have her former partner denied custody of the adopted
children.174
The court took note of the trial court’s conclusion that while the
adoptive mother was indeed the sole legal parent theretofore, the nonadoptive mother had played a full parental role, the continuation of which
165
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was in the children’s best interest.
The court’s affirmation of a trialcourt order of joint custody ratified the In re L.F.A. holding and clarified
that it extends to the realm of adopted children.176 Whether over the
biological or adoptive children of their same-sex partners, when putative
LGBT parents establish implied parentage they can, in Montana, assert
custody claims with the same force as heterosexual parents.177 The
ultimate resolution of the case makes the doctrine only clearer: when the
adoptive mother left Montana for an extended period and failed to
participate in the parenting plan, the trial court modified its order to grant
sole custody to the non-adoptive mother.178 Upon the adoptive mother’s
return, the case again reached the Montana Supreme Court, again resulting
in an affirmation.179 A lesbian partner who, under the mini-DOMA, had no
apparent parental rights nonetheless left a Montana court as the sole
custodial parent.
In the Snetsinger case, the Montana courts gave same-sex partners the
same access to their partners’ health benefits that opposite-sex partners
enjoyed.180 In In re L.F.A. and the two holdings of the Kulstad case, those
courts gave same-sex partners the same consideration over their partners’
children that opposite-sex implied parents would enjoy.181 As they allow
same-sex partners certain rights and benefits of marriage, these decisions
may seem not at all in keeping with the two mini-DOMA provisions
governing Montana family law.182 Yet as this Section has revealed,
Montana has a history of publicly encouraging traditional, formal marriage
while placidly tolerating the common-law cohabitation of consenting
adults.183 Allowing couples, like those in Snetsinger, to obtain the spousal
benefits they need to order their lives is out of sync with Montana’s miniDOMA prohibitions, but it is not out of line with Montana’s history of
allowing isolated populations to determine their own modes of marriage
and family life. Granting parental rights to same-sex couples also seems to
fit naturally into this narrative of independent life-ordering. Whether
Montanans’ endorsement of family independence will one day include a
right to full same-sex marriages remains unknown but now seems entirely
feasible.
175
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C. Case Law Developments in Alabama
Their same-sex marriage legislation notwithstanding, Illinois and
Montana have never provided the most severe challenges for marriageequality seekers. Few jurisdictions have been as hostile to same-sex
marriage as Alabama, a state that has produced only one openly gay
lawmaker in its one-hundred-ninety-four-year history.184 Alabama is one
of twenty-six states to have banned same-sex marriage both by
legislation185 and constitutional amendment.186 The Alabama Marriage
Protection Act187 passed the state’s house chamber by a seventy-nine to
twelve vote and the state senate by thirty to zero.188 A referendum adding
a gay-marriage ban to the state constitution was voted in by the public—
with eighty-one percent support—in June 2006.189
Both the statute and the amendment function as mini-DOMAs. The
former states that Alabama “shall not recognize as valid any marriage of
parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a
result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage
license was issued,”190 insulating Alabama’s government and courts from
the actions of marriage-equality states like Massachusetts and New York.
Identical language appears in the constitutional amendment, further
precluding full-faith-and-credit treatment.191
Alabama’s governors, lawmakers, and populace seem to have agreed
that same-sex marriage and its attendant rights shall have no viability in
their state, and this agreement is as strong and clear in Alabama as in any
other state in the union.192 Such deep and abiding policy statements could
be expected to translate into a judicial stance against parents in same-sex
unions, and indeed an exploration of Alabama’s child-custody case law
accordingly reads as a series of setbacks and disappointments for marriage
equality. Yet, even as far south as Montgomery, there are emerging signs
184
See Jake Grovum, Woman Trying to Change Alabama Gay Marriage Ban, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, July 6, 2013, at P1C (reporting on openly gay state legislator Patricia Todd’s plans to marry
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185
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186
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188
Same-Sex Marriages Banned in Alabama, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Apr. 28, 1998, at 7A.
189
Alabama Voters Send Mixed Message on Religion, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 8, 2006, at 32.
190
ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e).
191
See ALA. CONST. amend. 774(e) (stating Alabama “shall not recognize as valid any marriage
of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred”).
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STATE 4 (2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Flores-BarclayPublic-Support-Marriage-By-State-Apr-2013.pdf. All three states ban same-sex marriage by both
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of a doctrinal and practical evolution in Alabama’s position on same-sex
parental rights.193
In the recent past, Alabama’s courts have been notably hostile to samesex partners’ purported parenting rights. Almost contemporaneously with
the advent of Alabama’s mini-DOMA, the Alabama Supreme Court held in
Ex parte J.M.F.194 that a custodial parent’s openly gay lifestyle was
potentially detrimental to a child’s development and provided a legitimate
basis for a court to upend a custody order.195 In the underlying case, J.B.F
v. J.M.F.,196 a mother who had been awarded custody of her daughter upon
the dissolution of a marriage soon began cohabiting with a lesbian
partner.197 The mother and her partner formed a committed relationship
and exchanged rings, and the partner actively participated in the child’s life
by attending school functions and field trips.198 At the end of 1994,
however, the girl’s father filed a motion to modify custody on the grounds
that his ex-wife was “openly and notoriously” carrying on a lesbian
relationship.199
The trial court received a report from its appointed psychologist stating
that the daughter was “developing normally,” that she “desired to live with
the mother,” and that “fears about children . . . isolated in single-sex
lesbian or gay communities are unfounded.”200 It adduced testimony from
the child that she loved her mother, her mother’s partner, her father, and
her stepmother all in kind.201 Yet the trial court granted the modification,
transferring the girl to her father’s custody and issuing a visitation
restriction that prevented the mother’s partner from being present during
visits.202 Reviewing the case in 1997, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
characterized the child as a “bright, happy, well-adjusted seven-year-old
girl” who “enjoys living with her mother and her mother’s companion.”203
The court noted that the father considered his ex-wife “a good mother”
who had “done a good job of raising the child.”204 The court held that the
father bore the burden of demonstrating that the mother’s relationship
affected the child detrimentally; absent that, the mere fact of an open
homosexual relationship was not in itself grounds for a custody
193
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205

modification.
It reversed the trial court’s order, leaving the girl in the
same-sex household.206
In June 1998, roughly six weeks after Alabama’s statutory miniDOMA became law, the state supreme court overruled the appellate
decision, reinstating the trial court’s modification and holding:
[T]he inestimable developmental benefit of . . . a successful
marriage is undisputed.
The [remarried] father’s
circumstances have changed, and he is now able to provide
this benefit . . . . The mother’s circumstances have also
changed, in that she is unable, while choosing to conduct an
open cohabitation with her lesbian life partner, to provide this
benefit.207
The dissonance between the appellate and highest courts here is
telling.208 The appellate court had held that a custody modification “solely
because of a lesbian relationship” was “plainly and palpably wrong,”
apparently concluding that same-sex couples were equally fit to raise
children and requiring a showing of harm to mount a custody challenge.209
This holding was not out of line with the state’s mini-DOMA, which did
not, on its face, address child-custody issues or make it illegal for
homosexual citizens to produce and rear children.210 Still, ruling in the era
following that law, the state supreme court reversed to say that
heterosexual couples are—as the only couples capable of marrying—de
facto better parents than those of in same-sex relationships.211 As few
same-sex appellants could point to a clearer example of a “happy, welladjusted” child than that of the J.M.F. mother,212 the case suggests that, all
else being equal, any traditionally remarried parent will be able to secure
primary custody of his or her children against a same-sex-cohabiting ex,
even to the point of excluding the ex’s new partner from visitation. At the
conclusion of the J.M.F. cases, Alabama’s mini-DOMA regime and its
205
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child-custody case law appeared to be marching in lockstep.
The J.M.F. case did not address whether adoption might allow samesex partners to establish court-recognized parentage. However, a much
more recent Court of Civil Appeals case focusing on adoption turned on
the Alabama mini-DOMA as a bulwark against full faith and credit. In re
Adoption of K.R.S.213 followed the 2008 same-sex marriage, in California,
of an Alabama mother and a woman called C.D.S. who sought to adopt the
mother’s child, K.R.S.,214 pursuant to Alabama’s step-parent adoption
law.215 The court, after a straightforward recitation of the state’s statutory
and constitutional mini-DOMA components,216 concluded that C.D.S. and
the child’s mother were not married in Alabama, that C.D.S. was therefore
not a step-parent, and that the legislature and voting public had already
disposed of C.D.S.’s policy arguments in creating the mini-DOMA.217 The
court held that C.D.S. had no right to adopt the child, ensuring the state
remained entitled to deny same-sex partners parenting rights based on
extra-territorial marital proceedings under the existing mini-DOMA.218
In ruling against C.D.S., the court did offer the small hope that her
challenge was not formulated to reach constitutional issues, possibly
implying such a challenge could be mounted.219 But even so, the case
makes a robust statement that gay-marriage developments in other states
shall have no power to affect parenting rights in Alabama. The fact that
the case occurred fifteen years after J.B.F. v. J.M.F., and that the Court of
Civil Appeals decided it after being supportive of same-sex-parenting
capacity in that earlier case,220 may make the mini-DOMA-backed
pronouncements of this court all the sharper.
Alabama’s mini-DOMA is intended to prevent the advent of legal gay
marriage in states like California from foisting gay-marriage rights upon
citizens appearing in Alabama’s courts.221 The case of A.K. v. N.B.,222
which tested the doctrinal intimations laid out by the Alabama courts in
J.B.F. and K.R.S., followed (both in time and doctrine) on the heels of a
well-known California child-custody case, Elisa B. v. Superior Court.223 In
213
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Elisa B., the California Supreme Court declared that it could “perceive no
reason why both parents of a child cannot be women.”224 The women were
Elisa and Emily, who lived together as a committed couple between 1993
and 1999. They decided as partners each to get pregnant with the same
donor sperm and then supported each other throughout concurrent
pregnancies. After both had given birth (Emily to twins), they chose their
offspring’s names together, gave them a hyphenated family name, and
mutually breastfed them without regard to the biological relationships.225
When the couple broke up, Elisa—who had been the designated
breadwinner—eventually ceased supporting Emily and Emily’s two
biological children, claiming she had no paternal relationship to them.226
Recognizing that Elisa had participated in producing the children and had
made promises to care for them, a trial court ordered Elisa to pay child
support on an equitable-estoppel theory.227 The Court of Appeal held Elisa
was not a parent of Emily’s twins and reversed the order.228 The California
Supreme Court, relying on California’s Uniform Parentage Act229 but
applying it without regard to gender, held that as Elisa had “received the
twins into her home and openly held them out as her natural children” she
met the definition of a de facto parent under California law and had an
ongoing responsibility to support Emily’s offspring.230
A.K. v. N.B., the aforementioned Alabama case, differed from Elisa B.
in that its plaintiff sought to establish, rather than escape, her responsibility
for and rights over a child. Still, in other respects it was nearly identical.
A.K. and N.B. were a committed lesbian couple in California.231 In 1998,
N.B. donated an egg for artificial insemination and carried the child to
term;232 although only N.B.’s name appeared on the child’s birth
certificate, A.K.’s family name was recorded in the hyphenated last name
given to the baby.233 N.B. and A.K. separated in 2004, and by August
2005, N.B. had followed her parents to Alabama, where she established a
new home and eventually married a man.234 In September 2005, A.K. filed
a petition for parental recognition with the California courts to establish
224
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her right to visitation with the child, which eventually led to California
awarding her visitation and ordering that her name be added to the child’s
birth certificate as a second parent in the model of Elisa B.235 Yet an
Alabama trial court later refused to enforce the California order, leaving
A.K. essentially without any parental rights in Alabama.236
To this point, A.K. v. N.B. appears to embody the rationale of In re
Adoption of K.R.S.: Alabama strictly enforces its mini-DOMA to deny
same-sex-marital rights granted by other states. The Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals, however, reversed the lower court.237 The appellate court
held that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act238 (“PKPA”)
required Alabama to yield to California’s jurisdiction in the case because at
the time the California court took up the issue of A.K.’s parental status,
N.B. had not yet established residency in Alabama.239 Over N.B.’s plainly
stated request for a rejection of full faith and credit for child-custody
orders, the court opined:
[T]he PKPA does not merely apply to situations in which the
court of a child’s home state has entered an order or
judgment adjudicating a party’s visitation rights; rather, it
bars courts in other states from exercising jurisdiction to
make a custody or visitation determination during the
pendency of proceedings in the child’s home state.240
Here the PKPA, a 1980 federal law that predates DOMA and was
conceived and executed without any reference to the vagaries of same-sex
marriage, operates to enshrine same-sex partners’ rights over their
biological or, as in A.K. v. N.B., non-biological/non-adoptive children.
While the PKPA did not and could not direct Alabama’s courts to grant
custody rights to A.K. under Alabama law, it nonetheless allowed A.K. to
enforce such rights secured in California in Alabama’s courts—the
crosspollination of civil rights contemplated by this Note. The PKPA does
nothing overt to foist gay marriage upon mini-DOMA states, but it does
work to isolate a bundle of rights derived from state recognition of samesex relationships and ensure that those rights endure even after the parties
have relocated to mini-DOMA states that would not have devised the
rights in the first place.
There is a coda to A.K. v. N.B. that gives pause to any bold declaration
about the case: in Ex parte N.B., the Alabama Supreme Court rendered the
235
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case moot by vacating the original juvenile-court case and Court of Civil
Appeals reversal and quashing its own grant of certiorari.241 The supreme
court stated that as the Alabama cases had begun with an improper ex parte
motion by N.B., both of the lower courts’ orders had to be vacated.242
Hence, no state supreme court decision on the merits was ever taken, and,
as no further action has been filed, a final disposition of the state-level
doctrine remains unknown. The appellate court’s clear endorsement of full
faith and credit for out-of-state child-custody orders, however, coupled
with the supreme court’s disposal of the case on strictly procedural
grounds, may mean marriage-equality supporters have reason to be
optimistic that the parenting rights of same-sex partners, once established
in marriage-equality jurisdictions, will survive within the borders of
Alabama.
There is very recent evidence that such optimism is not misplaced. It
is true that the Alabama Supreme Court sent the clear message that since a
remarried heterosexual father could “provide [the] benefit” of a “successful
marriage,” while a now-single mother could not if “cohabit[ing] with her
lesbian life partner,” the father’s demands for a custody modification
would be granted.243 Yet at the end of July 2013, the Circuit Court of
Mobile County entered an order that appears to evade that high court’s
strictures. Walsh v. Hughes,244 echoing J.M.F., concerned a divorce in the
state of Washington after which the newly single mother, Hughes, entered
into a committed domestic partnership under that state’s laws with her
same-sex lover.245 According to an account published by Hughes herself,
after the ex-husband, Walsh, moved to Alabama with their four children,
Hughes moved from Washington to Alabama with the intention of
continuing to see the kids (in line with the terms of the couple’s
Washington visitation order).246
Once in Alabama, Walsh refused to allow the visits, leading to an
incident in which Hughes attempted to see the children at their school on
her appointed visitation day.247 School officials and local police refused to
countenance her Washington state visitation order,248 an echo in form, if
not in judicial substance, of the dispute in J.M.F. Walsh then filed a
241
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motion with the local court to modify visitation and prevent Hughes from
having unfettered contact with the children.249 Walsh’s attorney pointed to
Hughes and her lovers’ bathing together in front of the children, displaying
affection in front of them, and taking them to a gay-pride parade in
requesting that future visitation be supervised and with restrictions on
Hughes’ partner.250
Walsh v. Hughes ended in an agreed settlement, but the contents of that
agreement represent a stark departure from the doctrinal implications of
J.M.F. The Mobile Circuit Court approved a very favorable visitation
order for Hughes, restoring her right to overnight custody of her children
on alternate weekends and for large blocks of the summer.251 No
restriction was placed on Hughes’ partner nor on Hughes’ interaction with
her partner in the children’s presence; in fact, the court’s order makes no
mention of the partner or Hughes’ sexual orientation.252 The Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC), which had represented Hughes, trumpeted the
result, declaring it was “believed to be a first in Alabama”253: an Alabama
court had positively approved a same-sex partner’s child-custody rights
and had done so in an order apparently not to be reviewed or struck down
by a higher court.
Whether the case is a first is dubious; the SPLC admits that stingy
publishing makes it difficult to survey all Alabama custody orders,254 and
even then, a negotiated settlement is not a high court verdict with
precedential power. The result does, however, suggest that the doctrine
laid out in J.M.F. is not having an absolutely deleterious effect on the
parental rights of gay citizens. Both Hughes’ local attorney and the SLPC
insist they were eager to take the case to court,255 suggesting, if true, that
they may see in the appellate court’s holdings in J.M.F. and in A.K. v.
N.B256 the possibility of evolution in Alabama’s strict stance against out-of249
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state same-sex marital rights leading to in-state child-custody rights. It is
noteworthy that the final Order of Agreement in Walsh mandates that
Hughes shall pay Walsh $465 per month in child support while Walsh will
continue to insure the children through Medicaid.257 The plaintiff, and
perhaps the court, possibly valued non-custodial parent Hughes more as a
source of financial support than they felt affronted by her sexual
orientation and lifestyle. The resolution of Walsh v. Hughes may remain
an anomaly in Alabama’s child-custody case law, but it may also be a
harbinger.
VI. CONCLUSION
There have no doubt been myriad moments when marriage-equality
supporters imagined a Brown v. Board of Education258-type victory that
would, in one sweep, enshrine same-sex unions into America’s national
law and culture. Activists have every right and reason to pursue such a
strategy. Yet both law and culture are already being changed by the subtle
power of family-court decisions based on existing, non-revolutionary
common and statutory law. Such progress is often discounted as
incrementalism, but in the struggle for LGBT family law rights, there may
be great persuasive power in showing that what is being asked for is not an
exotic departure from social norms but simply a just application of existing
social mores. It may be precisely such subtle persuasion, built up case by
case through state courts, that birthed Illinois’ adoption of gay marriage in
2013. As each new state adopts same-sex marriage, new cases derived
from that state’s marriages may find their way to the mini-DOMA courts
of their neighboring jurisdictions, crosspollinating marriage equality
through parental rights and obligations.
In the Virginia of 2014, the eight-year-old ban on same-sex marriage
has been struck down by a federal judge as unconstitutional,259 and there
are signs this action is welcome: public polling of Virginians now shows
majority support for the mini-DOMA’s repeal260 while the state’s attorney
general refused to defend the mini-DOMA in the federal case.261 In the
most recent survey by Montana State University-Billings, a plurality of
257
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Montanans supported same-sex-marriage, the first poll ever to record
such a result.263 Though Alabama’s public remains unconvinced,264 the
state’s courts display an increasing willingness to consider—and even
endorse—the parental rights of LGBT parents. As such local courts award
more and more gay parents true custody rights over their children, local
communities have ever increasing opportunities to watch those parents
raise productive members of society. As the awareness of same-sex
couples as protectors and nurturers of the next generation grows, so may
public tolerance, then public appreciation, and at last public embrace of
LGBT marriage. To return to the Justice Brandeis epigraph: there may
come a day when allowing full marital status to same-sex couples will not
be seen as a radical social experiment. Denying it to them will.
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